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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter.
Neither party has any agrument on this point.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Neither party has any question on this point.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL
AND BEING DISCUSSED IN THIS REPLY BRIEF
(a)

The lower court did err in determining that the

Defendant Fleischmann gained nothing by Sheriff s sale on property
claimed to be owned by the Plaintiffs.
(b)

Rimaras, Inc. s interest in the property terminated

by the Sheriff s sale when it failed to redeem.
(c)

Hall and Rigby never had any interest in the

property.
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
1.

Title 78-22-1:

"Lien of judgment — From the time the judgment
of the District Court or Circuit Court is docketed
and filed in the office of the Clerk of the District
Court of the County it becomes a lien upon all the
real property of the judgment debtor, not exempt
from execution, in the County in which the judgment
is entered, owned by him at the time or by him
thereafter acquired during the existence of said
lien.n
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
As to the statement of the case, the Appellant acknowledges
that the claim became operative when filed in Garfield County, Utah,
on the 8th day of July, 1985.

She alleges further that property
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taxes were paid by the Respondents but were paid tor less than the
seven-year period being paid in the spring ol 1986 for the previous
five years, then missing 1986, and paying the taxes in the fall ot
1987 for only the 1987 taxes.

The 1986 taxes were actually paid

by the Appellant during the course of this action.

In addition,

Defendant Rigby liled an answer pro se, he was never given notice
of trial setting and he did not participate.

He still has rights.

The Attorney who had represented Defendant Hall in some phases of
the matter was present in the courtroom at the time ol trial.

The

claim that Defendants Hall and Rimaras, Inc. did not participate
is made in that they claim nothing in the property and because
that was the only item that was being tried.

Judge Tibbs called

counselsf attention to the fact that the interest of Rimaras, Inc.
was terminated at the time of the Sheriff s sale, transcript, Page
45, Lines 15 and 16.
STATEMENT Ol FACTS
1.

Pertaining to the statement oi facts contained in

Respondents * Brief, there is some argument since paragraph 2
thereof is substantially correct with the exception that the
document was not recorded with the bariield County Recorder unless
it has been recorded entirely alter the trial, and that is in
error.

Pertaining to any exchange ol property, the only evidence

of that was PlaintiffsT testimony, there is nothing in writing and
nothing has been recorded.

There has not been any recording oi

this transaction regardless ot paragraph 2 ot the statement of
facts in Respondents

Brief.

In addition, Respondents1 Brier.
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In addition, Respondents thought they were dealing with Defendants
Hall and Rigby on a personal basis; they were not aware that the
Defendants Hall and Rigby did not own the property.

(Transcript,

Page 15, Lines 31 to 36.)
2.

Pertaining to paragraph 3 of the statement of tacts

of Respondents1 Brief, the monetary transactions which caused them
to turn to Miss Fleischmann was an agreement that if these items
were paid, the lien would be released.

The Respondents had full

knowledge of this and had knowledge of this prior to the Sherifl's
sale.

They had knowledge that Rimaras, Inc. was the record holder

of the property.

Respondents did nothing about it.

(Exhibits 4

and 15.)
3.

Respondents1 statement of facts, paragraph 4, is

accurate as far as the Appellant has knowledge.

Further, the

Findings of Fact claim the deedsreferred to as Exhibit 3 were
personal deeds from Hall and Rigby and that they never owned an
interest in the property at any time whatsoever.

And at the

time the same was claimed to have been executed, the 20th day
of January, 1981, the deed to Rimaras, inc. had not been
recorded and had not been delivered as the title to the property
was in the name of a lady by the name of Stella Warwick formerly
known as Stella Allen.

The deed given to Rimaras, Inc. was not

recorded until after the issuance and qualilication ot Exhibit 2.
This is purported to be a deed from Rigby and Hall and qualified
by the letter, Exhibit 2.
4.

Pertaining to paragraph 5 ot Respondents' statement

of facts, there is a very interesting item there pertaining to

-6-

Exhibit 4.

This does not tell the whole story as of the date of

Exhibit 4, to-wit:

The approximate date ot the 5th day of November,

1987, which was never acknowledged and was qualified by a letter
of the 4th day of November, 3 987, from Floyd J. Higby to Robert
Garland which is Exhibit 15, and it states that it will be delivered
in the future when certain conditions have been met.

While stress

is made on the fact that Rimaras, Inc. did not object, the default
at the time of the trial, in paragraph 5 of Respondents

statement

of facts, one must remember that Rimaras, Ine.'s interest had been
sold to Appellant in excess ot six months before the trial date in
a Sheriff's sale and a Sherifffs Deed had been issued.

Under those

conditions, there was no point for Rimaras, Inc. to be concerned as
it had nothing left in the property at that time.

One very interest-

ing item in paragraph 5 of Respondents' statement of facts in
Respondents1 Brief, is, nRimaras Inc. issued a deed to Plaintiffs
on the 20th day of October, 1988 which was recorded on the 31st
day of October, 1989."
1988.

One presumes it was recorded in October,

This was after Judge Tibbs had decided the case on the 6th

day of October, 1988.

One must wonder why the Respondents are

not relying upon Judge Tibbsf decision and is still attempting
to get a deed from Rimaras, Inc. when they did not do so before
the trial.

Of course, Rimaras, Inc.?s interest had already been

turned to Appellant Miss Fleischmann by the Sheriff's Deed prior
thereto.

The so-called deed from Rimaras, Inc. to the Respondents

of the 20th day of October, 1988 is a nullity. One cannot help
but wonder what is the purpose of bringing it up as a new item in
an appeal at this point, and one cannot help but wonder if
-7_

Respondents thought it was necessary to obtain the same.
5.

Pertaining to paragraphs 6 and 7 of the statement of

facts of Respondentsr Brief, Exhibit
inated.
taxes.

Exhibit

5 is again erroneously denom-

5 is the receipt for the payment of the 1987

(Transcript page 39, line 24; page 41, line

3.)

This shows

the testimony of the Garfield County Treasurer, Mrs. Henrie, as to
the payment of taxes on this particular property that were material
in this case.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ON APPEAL
POINT I:

Rimaras, Inc. owned Lot #128 in July, 1985,

when AppellantTs lien was fixed on Lot #128.
POINT II:

Rimaras, Inc. owned the property until the

SheriffTs Sale and the issuance of a Sherifffs Deed in 1988.
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL
POINT I
RIMARAS, INC. OWNED LOT #128 IN JULY, 1985, WHEN
APPELLANT'S LIEN WAS FIXED ON LOT #128.
Regardless of the cases that cite the date of recording,
for there to be a transfer, there has to be some sort of a conveyance
of some interest in the property by the property owner to which the
transfer is being made to.

This is not in existence in this case.

It is the basis of Kartchner v. State Tax Commission and Wyatt, 4
Utah 2d 382, 294 P.2d 790, (1956), and the cases that follow that
line of thought.

While there is no question that recording gives

notice to other people as to pertaining to the parties of any transaction, there has to be some sort of a transaction before there can
be a transfer; this we do not have in this particular instance.
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There is no question that Mr. Garland was dealing with Mr. Hall
and Mr. Ki gby on an item in Exhibit 1 which is the only thing
that was in existence prior to judgment date, the? 6th day of
October, 1988, that said he had an interest in any property.
is not the property listed as Lot #128, but is Lot #126.

This

The

unsupported testimony of Mr. Garland is to the el feet that at
some time thereafter, his wife decided otherwise and they traded
Lot #126 for Lot #128.

They did not in anyway have a written item.

One further affirms that Higby and Hall are real estate specialists.
Certainly

had they intended to make any trade whatsoever, they

would have done so in writing.

Aiso is this true when one reviews

the titles of the property and it has never been in their names.
(Transcript, page 33, line 16 to page 38, line 18)

This is the

testimony of Thomas V. Hatch, a qualified title insurance man.
In said testimony, Exhibit 11 is identified as an abstract of title
on the property during the critical period.

Exhibit 10 is also

identified as the SheriffTs Deed to Miss Fleischmann.
shows

Exhibit 11

interest in Rimaras, Inc., the entity not involved in the

lawsuit, dated about the 1st day of January, 1980, and recorded
approximately one year later.

At no time does the name Hall or

the name of Rigby show to have any interest in the property.

The

abstract then shows the lien by virtue of the judgment filing in
July, 1985, by which the lien of the AppelLant was perfected.
The abstract further shows the Sherifffs sale and the Sherifffs
deed.

Until after the trial, there is

nothing from Rimaras, Inc.

to anybody except to Miss Eleischmann of any interest on this
property.
-9.

If one looks at Exhibit 1 pertaining to other property,
takes Mr. Garland's testimony, it shows that Mr. Garland, Mr. Hall
and Mr. Rigby decided to change it as well as Exhibits 2 and 3.
The deed from Hall and Rigby to Garland dated January 20, 1981
was on property that they did not own, together with a letter
from Hall to Mr. Garland indicating that in the future the original
would be sent to him.
Rimaras, Inc.

This did nothing to in anyway obligate

Under the circumstances, there can be no question

but that in July, 1985, when Miss FleischmannTs judgment against
Rimaras, Inc. was filed in the office of the Garfield County Clerk,
it became a lien against whatever property there was belonging to
Rimaras, Inc. in Garfield County, Utah.

This piece of real property

did belong to Rimaras, Inc. at that time as a deed had been recorded
in 1981, showing it belonging to Rimaras, Inc.

and nothing had

been done since that time, recorded or otherwise that in anyway
transfered the interest of Rimaras, Inc.

Regardless of what we

say, personal transactions of Hall and Rigby are not the transactions of Rimaras, Inc., a corporation.
to be at any point in the action.

They are not represented

Under these conditions, at the

time of filing of the transcript of judgment in Garfield County,
Utah, in July, 1985, the judgment lien affixed on this property,
and any other real property belonging to Rimaras, Inc. in Garfield
County, Utah.
The Respondents have gone to great lengths to tell us
about the effect of various recording statutes and items of that
nature.

However, they have absolutely no bearing in this matter

because until the Respondents can show some place that they obtained
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from Rimaras, Inc. the interest or Rimaras, inc. in

the property,

the interest ol Rimaras, Inc. in that property continues to exist
until it is some place extinguished as it was by the Sherirl's
sale in 1988.

.from the time ol 1985 to 1988, it was subject to

the lien of Miss lleisehmann, the Appellant.
One cannot help but wonder ii all is welL with the argument ot the Respondents when the Respondents went to the time and
expense ot securing trom Rimaras, Inc. a deed to the Respondents
on the 20th day ol October, 1988, and recording the same on the
31st day of October, 1988.
trial date.

Both of these dates were after the

Contrary to the opinion set forth by the Respondents,

this is not a recording question.
ol the interest of Rimaras, Inc.

This is a question ot conveyance
11 said interest has been

conveyed at all, it was done after the trial.

At that time, the

interest of the Appellant was without impairment and said interest
was subject to Appellant s lien and was only conveyed by the
Sheriff s sale m

1988.

Under these conditions, taking Mr. Garland's testimony,
at best he is what we used to call a n squatter n and paid taxes
tor 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1987.
taxes on the property in 1986.

He missed paying

Apparently, Respondents do not

ieel that they had sutficient color of title to justity holding
the property in connection with this matter inasmuch as they entirely
failed to gi\e any eftect whatsoever in this action to Chapter 6
of Title 57, Utah Code Annotated, (1953 as amended) pertaining to
occupying claimants.

Had they had any color of title whatsoever,

the Respondents might still be looking at that chapter.
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Respondents

have no color of title whatsoever that is within the realm 01 this
Court at this time.

We must come to the conclusion that as of

July, 3985, the judgment lien of Miss Fleischmann takes the entire
interest of the property in question as it was the property of
Rimaras, Inc. at that time.

Rimaras, Inc. had done nothing to

change the title of this property from its name.

There is no

question that based upon Exhibits 4 and 15, as of November, 1987,
the Respondents acquired actual knowledge of the judgment lien of
Miss lleischmann, and that Rigby made arrangements claiming certain
monies were due to obtain a release ot the lien from Miss
fleischmann by virtue of the payment of certain monies which
they did not pay.

(Exhibits 4 and 15.)

This brings us to the

conclusion that the judgment lien of Miss lleischmann in July,
1985, became a lien against this particular property as it was then
the property of Rimaras, Inc.
POINT II
RIMARAS, INC. OWNED THE PROPERTY UNTIL THE SHERIFF'S
SALE AND THE ISSUANCE OF A SHERIFF'S DEED IN 1988.
The lien having affixed on the property, the question came
as to whether or not there was anything to sell in 1988.

There

still was no evidence of Rimaras, Inc. to convey to anybody Lot
#128, of which we still do not have any information whatsoever.

The

only item that has been done that aftected Lot #128 as lar as Rimaras,
Inc.fs interest is concerned was the filing o± the judgment lien of
Miss Fleischmann in 1985. Under these conditions, Mr. Garland refused
to make the cash payments that had been arranged for him by Mr.
Rigby in November, 1987, theretore, the Appellant saw fit to go
forward with the Sheriff's sale.

And this is the result.
-12-

Mr.

Garland indicated that he had nothing from Rimaras, Inc. that said
he had any interest in the property.
to line 22.)

(Transcript, Page 26, line 20

Under these conditions, until he can produce something

from Rimaras, Inc. that says that he has an interest in the property,
then he has no interest in the property.

He obtained a deed after

the trial as is set forth in paragraph 5 of the Statement of Facts
of Respondents' Brief.

Respondents are still acknowledging that

they are still trying to get title from Rimaras, inc.

Keep in

mind that Respondentsf counsel was at the Sheriff's sale.

Apparently,

the relations at the time of trial were where deeds could be obtained,
and one cannot help but wonder why the Respondents did not make a
redemption between the time of the Sheriff s sale and the issuance
of the Sheriff's deed.
However, a great deal is made by the Respondents of the
fact that Rimaras, Inc. did not appear at the time of trial.

There

was no question that prior to the time of trial, the Sheriff's deed
had been issued as it had been issued in July, 1988.
was the 6th day of October, 1988.

The trial date

One cannot help but wonder what

is the purpose of the Respondents obtaining a deed from Rimaras,
Inc. on the 20th day of October, 1988, and what can it convey with
a Sheriff's deed being in existence and recorded in July, 1988.
Under these conditions, we conclude that the Sheriff's deed and
the sale transferred to Miss Fleischmann the title of the property,
and that the title of the property was in Rimaras, Inc. until
the judgment sale.

The Respondents Garland had no interest whatso-

ever in Lot #128 except that ot a "Squatter."
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CONCLUSION ON APPEAL
Therefore, Appellant comes to the conclusion that there
has never been a document whatsoever or any sort of a transaction
whatsoever involving Rimaras, Inc. to Respondents Garland.

The

Respondents have admitted that he has nothing from Rimaras, Inc.
that in anyway conveys to them that gives them any interest in
the property whatsoever, and that their entire transaction was
with Hall and Rigby.

There is no showing whatsoever that they

have ever owned any interest in the property.
Under these conditions, the decision of the Garfield
District Court should be reversed.

Lot #128 should be awarded

to Miss Fleischmann together with her costs and expenses in
connection with this appellate procedure.
DATED this

/j

day of March, 1989.

Respectfully submitted,

C. k /v
PATRICK H. FENTON
Attorney for Appellant
Miss Anna R. Fleischmann
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ADDENDUM

15

November 4, 1987

Mr. Robert Garland
i5t>0 Palamino
Henderson, Nevada 89C]S
Dear Mr. Garland.
With regard to the outstanding bill you yet owe for the construction
of your log homo on Lot #128, Tommy Creek Subdivision, I am enclosing
the following it- mized accounting:
Beginning Balance August, 1981
990.93
Interest
August, 1982 99,.09 1,090.02
Interest
August, 1983 109..00 1.199.02
Interest
August, 1984 119..90 1.318.92
Interest
August. 1985 131..89 1.450.81
Interest
August. 1986 145..08 1,595.89
Interest
August, 1987 159,.59 1.755.48
Interest ir.48 per day from August 1. 1987)'
1 have prepared a Warranty Deed which T have signed and notorized to
you fcr Lot #128, Tommy Creek Subdivision and will place it with
Security Title Company.
With regard to the Judgement which is currently against the property,
T have contacted Mr. Patrick Fenton. Attorney for the Fleischmanns.
He has instructed me to have the funds placed in escrow with the
Title Company after which He will make the necessary provissions to
release the lien. He will make no such provissions until the $1,755.48
plus the daily accruing interest is in the escrow account.
I will deliver the Deed to Security Title Company on November 5, 1987.

pc.

Mr. Patrick Fenton, Attorney
Security Title Compjnv
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